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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. 
DON W. DUNBAR, 
Defendant and Appellant.; 
I BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 920341-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Driving During 
Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-2-136, by a jury, in the First Circuit Court of Cache County, 
State of Utah, Logan City Department, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
presiding• 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
In addition to the twelve (12) issues raised in the Brief of 
Appellant, each of which are addressed herein, Appellee THE STATE 
OF UTAH claims that the evidence introduced in this case was 
sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction. The standard of 
review is as follows: fl...[T]he function of a reviewing court is 
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limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence 
regarding each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. 
..." State v Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991), at 1150. 
GOVERNING STATUTES AND RULES 
Copies of the following statutes and Court Rules cited herein 
are included in the Addendum to this Brief: 
1. Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-4-5. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-136. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-104. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-137. 
6. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3). 
7. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-122. 
8. Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-412. 
9. Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 3, 1991, the Defendant was personally served with 
copies of a Criminal Summons and Information, charging him with the 
crime of Driving During Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-136. The Summons and Information 
were subsequently filed in the First Circuit Court of Cache County, 
Logan City Department. Copies of those pleadings are included in 
the Addendum to this Brief. 
The Defendant failed to appear in response to the Criminal 
Summons, so a Bench Warrant was issued for his arrest. On January 
31, 1992, after having been arrested on that and other unrelated 
bench warrants, the Defendant was arraigned and the public defender 
was appointed to represent him. 
Defense counsel subsequently filed*a Motion to Dismiss, to 
which the State responded, which was argued before the Court and 
denied on April 3, 1992. (See Transcript of Motion Hearing, April 
3, 1992, hereinafter referred to as "Tr.-3ff.) 
Defense counsel also filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction, to which the State also responded, and which was 
argued before the Court and denied on April 24, 1992. (See 
Transcript of Motion Hearing, April 24, 1992, hereinafter referred 
to as "Tr.-24".) 
On May 8, 1992, the case was tried before a jury. At the 
conclusion of the case, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as 
charged. (See Transcript of Trial, May 8, 1992, hereinafter 
referred to as "Tr.-8".) Judgment of conviction was thereupon 
entered by the Court. This appeal has been taken by the Defendant 
from that Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 17, 1991, Officer James Meacham of the Cache County 
Sheriff's Office, while stopped at the intersection of 300 South 
Street and Main Street in Logan City, Cache County, State of Utah, 
noticed the Defendant driving a motorcycle. (Tr.-3, pp. 7-8; Tr.-8, 
pp. 51-56). Officer Meacham had personal knowledge of the 
Defendant's identity from previous dealings with him. (Tr.-8, pp. 
50-51) . 
At that time, Officer Meacham was off-duty, in his personal 
vehicle, and without his customary law enforcement equipment. 
(Tr.-3, p. 9; Tr.-8, p. 73). Because of his prior dealings with 
the Defendant, Officer Meacham suspected that the Defendant's 
driver's license was suspended as of that date. (Tr.-3, pp. 4-5; 
Tr.-8, pp. 58-61). He thereupon checked on the status of the 
Defendant's driver's license, and ordered a certified copy of the 
Defendant's driving record from the Utah Driver's License Division. 
(Record, hereinafter abbreviated as "R.", pp. 76-84). 
After confirming with the Driver's License Division that the 
Defendant's driver's license was, in fact, suspended on May 17, 
1991, Officer Meacham requested that an Information be filed and a 
Criminal Summons be issued for the charge of Driving During 
Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
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$41-2-136. (R., pp. 184-186). Copies of the Information and 
Criminal Summons are included in the Addendum to this Brief. [The 
procedural history of this case thereafter is set forth in the 
Statement of the Case, above.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
the evidence introduced in this case was sufficient to support the 
Defendant's conviction. State v. Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 (Utah 
1991) . 
2. Because any delay in this case was caused by Defendant's 
failure to appear and voluntarily absenting himself from the 
jurisdiction, he was not denied a speedy trial. State v. Hoyt, 806 
P. 2d 204 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Because Defendant was personally served with copies of an 
Information and Criminal Summons, and never appeared in response 
thereto, he was not denied equal protection or due process. Rule 
6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
4. The trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in 
this case, because the crime was completed within Logan City, Cache 
County, State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §78-4-5. 
5 
5. The method by which the jury panel was initially seated 
was irrelevant, because each party was afforded full opportunity to 
exercise its challenges to individual jurors. 
6. The trial court took great care to explain to and 
instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the 
Defendant's right not to testify. 
7. No evidence was introduced that the Defendant was driving 
in River Heights, as previously directed-by the trial court. 
8. The mere subsequent expiration of the Defendant's 
driver's license did not change its status from being previously 
suspended. Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-412. 
9. The charge of Driving Without a License was not a lesser-
included offense of the original charge of Driving During 
Suspension. Utah Code Ann. §§41-2-104, 41-2-137, and 76-1-402(3). 
Therefore, the Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction to 
that effect. 
10. The mere overhearing of defense counsel's name by a juror 
during a recess was incidental and inconsequential. Logan City v. 
Carlsen, 799 P. 2d 224 (Utah App. 1990). 
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11. The Defendant was properly identified in this case, and 
offered no evidence in rebuttal. 
12. The mere fact that the investigating officer also served 
as bailiff in a previous motion hearing in this case did not 
prejudice the Defendant in any way. 
13. The trial court properly permitted the State to amend the 
date of the offense to conform to the evidence. Rule 4(d), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
In State v Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the standard of review of sufficiency of 
the evidence, as follows: 
The proper standard of review for appeals concerning the 
sufficiency of evidence is well established. In making the 
determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a 
second fact finder. It is not the function of a reviewing 
court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility 
of witnesses. The mere existence of conflicting evidence, 
therefore, does not warrant reversal. Rather, the function of 
a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is 
sufficient competent evidence regarding each element of the 
charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, when 
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
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therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict• It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light, 
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction. ... 813 P. 
2d at 1150. 
In this case, the Defendant elected not to present any 
evidence in his defense. (Tr.-8, p. 93). Consequently, the 
testimony of Officer Meacham, combined with the certified driving 
record of the Defendant, Exhibit "1", constituted sufficient, 
competent, and unrebutted evidence on each element of the charge 
for the jury to convict the Defendant. Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the State respectfully submits that 
the evidence introduced in this case was sufficient to support the 
jury verdict, and that the Defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed by this Court in all respects. 
POINT II: DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
In this case, the Defendant was served with a copy of the 
Summons and Information by Deputy James Meacham on June 3, 1991. 
(R., pp. 184-186; Tr.-3, p. 9). He failed to appear in response to 
the Summons on either June 4, 1991, or June 11, 1991, being the 
next two (2) Tuesdays following that service. (Tr.-3, pp. 10-11, 
22-23; see Court calendars attached as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to 
Reply to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial (R., pp. 128 -
138)). Instead, he voluntarily absented himself from the 
jurisdiction. (Tr.-3, pp. 24, 27). 
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Thereafter, a Bench Warrant was issued. After the Defendant 
was brought back before the Court on another, unrelated Bench 
Warrant, he was then arraigned on this Information on January 31, 
1992. (R., pp. 172-174). The matter then proceeded through pre-
trial motions, and trial was held on May 8, 1992. Notwithstanding 
the jail sentence which he served in connection with another case, 
the Defendant has never been incarcerated on the charge in this 
case. (Tr.-3, pp. 12-13). 
In Barker v Winqo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States 
Supreme Court established a balancing test in dealing with the 
right to a speedy trial, considering four (4) factors: (1) the 
length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the Defendant's 
assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the Defendant. The 
Utah appellate courts have adopted this balancing test on this 
issue. See, State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 P.2d 67 (1973); 
State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990); State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 
204 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, in considering the length of and the reason for 
any delay, it is readily apparent that all delays before the trial 
were caused by the Defendant's own conduct. If he had appeared, 
pursuant to the Summons which was served upon him on June 3, 1991, 
and requested a trial, the trial would have been scheduled shortly 
thereafter. Instead, the Defendant voluntarily absented himself 
from the jurisdiction. It was not until he was arrested on various 
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other bench warrants that he was brought back before the Court to 
be arraigned in this case. 
Once the case was brought back onto the calendar, the Court 
was obliged to deal with Defendant's pre-trial motions, prior to 
the trial itself. After various hearings, the trial was held on 
May 8, 1992. 
The Defendant first asserted the claim of denial of a speedy 
trial, by way of his Motion to Dismiss filed on February 7, 1992. 
(R., pp. 147-159). [On February 4, 1992, the Court had initially 
set the trial for February 21, 1992. (R., p 170). The next day, 
defendant and his counsel filed a waiver of trial within 30 days, 
pending the State's response to his discovery request. (R., pp. 
168-169).] However, because the entire time period between the 
date the Defendant was served with the Information and Summons 
(June 3, 1991) and the date of his arraignment (January 31, 1992) 
was caused by the Defendant voluntarily absenting himself from the 
jurisdiction, no prejudice accrued to the Defendant. Furthermore, 
the time period between the date of arraignment and the date of 
trial was occupied by responding to and hearing the Defendant's 
pre-trial motions. Therefore, as this Court noted in State v. 
Hoyt, cited above, "... When a defendant's actions cause delay in 
the trial date, the right to a speedy trial is temporarily waived 
by those actions. ...' [T]he right to a speedy trial is meant to be 
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a shield against oppression, and not a sword to be used to 
decapitate the process of justice. '...ff 806 P. 2d at 208. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly 
ruled that Defendant was not denied a speedy trial in this case, 
and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss accordingly. This Court 
should affirm that ruling. 
POINT III: DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE 
PROCESS. 
Defendant claims that the officer's failure to either issue to 
him a citation, or to arrest him on the spot, somehow constitutes 
a violation of equal protection and due process. Officer Meacham 
explained that he did not arrest or cite the Defendant on the day 
he saw him driving, because he was not in uniform and did not have 
his customary law enforcement equipment with him. (Tr.-3, p. 9; 
Tr.-8, p. 73). Consequently, after verifying the fact that the 
Defendant's driver's license was suspended as of the date of the 
incident, and obtaining a certified copy of his driving record, an 
Information and Summons were issued in this case. 
Defendant's argument ignores the fact that, pursuant to Rule 
6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a summons may be issued in 
lieu of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the 
accused. That procedure is expressly authorized and sanctioned by 
applicable law, and was followed in this case. The date when the 
original documents were ultimately filed with the Court is 
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irrelevant to Defendant's claim, because he was personally served 
with a copy of the Information and Summons on June 3, 1991, and 
then never appeared in response thereto until he was arrested in 
January, 1992. Therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain that 
he was not cited or arrested on the date of this incident. 
Defendant's argument is without merit. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT HAD PROPER JURISDICTION. 
In May and June, 1991, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-4-
5, the First Circuit Court had jurisdiction over all classes of 
misdemeanors occurring within Logan City, because there was neither 
a municipal justice court nor a county justice court in existence 
at that time. [The Logan City Municipal Justice Court was created, 
effective January 1, 1992.] 
The testimony of Officer Meacham was clear and undisputed that 
he saw the Defendant driving a motorcycle within the city limits of 
Logan, Utah. (Tr.-3, pp. 7-8; Tr.-8, pp. 52-57). At that point, 
the elements of "driving on a highway within Cache County" of the 
charge of Driving on Suspension were complete; and all that 
remained was to prove that the Defendant's driver's license was 
suspended as of that date, which was accomplished by way of the 
certified copy of Defendant's driving record, Exhibit "1". The 
fact that the Defendant then proceeded and was followed by the 
officer into a neighboring community, where a municipal justice 
court is located, is irrelevant. The offense was complete at the 
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intersection in Logan, Utah, where the Defendant was first seen 
driving by the officer. The Circuit Court properly exercised its 
jurisdiction in this case, and ruled correctly in denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction in this 
case. This Court should affirm that ruling. 
POINT V: THE METHOD OF SEATING THE JURY PANEL WAS IRRELEVANT. 
The method in which the jury panel was initially called in 
this case is irrelevant. No matter how they were seated to begin 
with, each party was afforded full and fair opportunity to 
challenge individual jurors for cause, and to exercise the 
requisite number of peremptory challenges. (Tr.-8, pp. 2-37; R., p. 
36). 
The Defendant has failed to cite any authority or otherwise to 
demonstrate any legitimate reason why the method of preliminarily 
seating the jury in this case could possibly have rendered the jury 
which was selected to try the case either unfair or partial. 
Therefore, because any error in seating the jury was harmless in 
this case, the Defendant's argument is without merit, and should be 
disregarded. 
POINT VI: THE JURY WAS PROPERLY IMPANELED. 
Defendant's claim that the jurors were not willing to give him 
the presumption of innocence has no basis in fact. The record 
indicates that the presumption of innocence was explained 
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thoroughly by the Court during voir dire. (Tr.-8, pp. 27-35). The 
Court specifically explained the Defendant's right not to testify. 
(Tr.-8. pp. 32-33). Finally, the Court further pursued Defense 
counsel's claim that only one juror could be fair, by asking, "If 
you could not be fair, if you cannot be fair and wouldn't want 
somebody with your frame of mind sitting on the case, raise your 
hand." (Tr.-8, p. 34). The record is silent thereafter, indicating 
that no hand was raised. 
Furthermore, the Court instructed the jury on the presumption 
of innocence and the Defendant's right not to testify. (R., pp. 38, 
41, 50, 51). 
Therefore, Defense counsel's argument is taken out of context. 
The record clearly reflects that the Court took great care to 
insure that a fair and impartial jury was seated and correctly 
instructed. There is no basis for claiming otherwise. 
POINT VII: THE MENTION OF DRIVING IN RIVER HEIGHTS WAS IRRELEVANT. 
The only time during the trial when the City of River Heights 
was mentioned was during Mr. Preston's opening statement. (Tr.-8, 
pp. 47-48). Defense counsel immediately objected, the Court 
instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and Mr. Preston 
then explained that the State's position was that the Defendant was 
driving a motor vehicle iji Logan City while his driver's license 
was suspended. Mr. Preston's opening statement was not evidence. 
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When Officer Meacham was called to testify, he merely stated 
that he followed the Defendant "approximately a mile-and-a-half to 
two miles, total." (Tr.-8, p. 56). The City of River Heights was 
never mentioned. 
As set forth in Point IV, above, Mr. Preston scrupulously 
avoided any reference to the Defendant driving in the City of River 
Heights during the presentation of evidence, consistent with the 
ruling of the trial court on April 24, 1992. (Tr.-24, pp. 5-11). 
Because the Defendant did not testify, *no rebuttal evidence on 
driving in River Heights was necessary. All evidence introduced by 
the State established that the crime was completed in Logan City, 
Cache County, State of Utah. Defendant has demonstrated no 
legitimate basis for a mistrial on this issue. 
POINT VIII: THE EXPIRATION OF DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS 
IRRELEVANT. 
At the trial of this case, the State introduced into evidence 
as Exhibit "1" a certified copy of the Defendant's driving record. 
(R., pp. 76-84). That record shows that the Defendant's Utah 
driver's license was last suspended on July 24, 1989, which status 
remained effective on the date of this incident. The fact that 
Defendant's driver's license may have subsequently expired is 
irrelevant. 
Defense counsel cites no authority for the proposition that, 
once a driver's license expires, it is no longer suspended. It is 
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obvious that a driver's license which has merely expired may be 
readily renewed, while a driver's license which has been suspended 
may not be reinstated without compliance with the terms and 
conditions provided by law. (R., pp. 78-79; see Utah Code Ann. §41-
12a-412). Defendant's argument is without merit, and the trial 
court properly denied Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on 
that issue. 
POINT IX: DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER-
INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
The Defendant was not entitled to a lesser-included offense 
instruction on the charge of Driving Without a License, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-104, in this case. First, 
contrary to defense counsel's representations to the trial court, 
and his proposed jury instruction and verdict forms (R., pp. 58-
60), that charge is not a lesser included offense of the underlying 
charge of Driving During Suspension. It is not an infraction, as 
represented by defense counsel; instead, it is a Class C 
Misdemeanor, as is the original charge, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§41-2-137. [Utah Code Ann. §41-6-12, cited by defense counsel, 
only applies to violations of Chapter J5 of Title 41. Violations of 
Chapter 2, of Title 41 are governed by §41-2-137, above.] 
Therefore, by definition/ because it was the same degree of offense 
as the original chargef it was not a "lesser" included offense. 
Second, it was not an "included" offense, as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. §76-1-402(3). As set forth in Point VIII, above, a 
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person's driver's license may still be suspended, subject to 
reinstatement, even after it has expired, and defense counsel has 
cited no authority to the contrary. As this Court observed in 
State v Kinsey, 797 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1990), in comparing 
the statutory elements of each crime, it is evident that §41-2-104 
merely prohibits operating a motor vehicle unless the person is a 
licensed driver, while §41-2-136 adds the additional element that 
the person's driver's license has first been denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked, and the person then operates a motor 
vehicle while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked. Expiration of the license is not tantamount to a status 
of being denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked, since it does 
not require the same procedure for reinstatement. 
Finally, Defendant provided no rational basis for the 
jury to acquit him of the original charge, since he put on no 
evidence in his defense. In State v Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 
1983) at 531, the Supreme Court held that "the evidence must 
provide a rational basis for both acquitting of the charged offense 
and convicting of the lesser included offense." (Emphasis in 
original.) Defendant provided no such basis in this case. The 
trial court properly refused to give Defendant's proposed 
instruction on what was, in fact, not a lesser included offense. 
POINT X: THERE WAS NO IMPROPER CONTACT WITH A JUROR IN THIS CASE. 
In this case, during a recess of the trial, one of the jurors 
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apparently overheard the name of Mr. Perry being mentioned in a 
conversation which took place in the foyer between Mr. Preston and 
Officer Meacham. The Court immediately examined that juror on the 
record (Tr.-8, pp. 81-85), and determined that no improper contact 
occurred. 
In Logan City v Carlsen, 799 P. 2d 224 (Utah App. 1990) at 
226, this Court observed that incidental or inconsequential 
contacts will not give rise to this rule (raising a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice) . By the stage of the trial when the 
conversation occurred, the jury had long since been questioned and 
sworn, and the State had concluded its case-in-chief. The juror in 
question had been present throughout the proceedings, and had 
obviously seen and heard Mr. Perry in the Courtroom. The mere 
overhearing of his name during a subsequent recess constitutes the 
most insignificant, incidental, and inconsequential contact 
imaginable. 
Following his questioning of the juror, the Court was 
satisfied that no prejudice had occurred. Defense counsel's after-
the-fact Affidavit of Possible Juror Bias (R., pp. 8-9) is of no 
avail, since there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that 
that juror either demonstrated any actual bias or prejudice during 
the trial, or overheard any improper comments by counsel or the 
officer during the recess. No improper contact occurred in this 
case. 
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POINT XI: DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY IDENTIFIED IN THIS CASE. 
Contrary to defense counsel's representation that the portion 
of the trial transcript quoted in the Appendix to Appellant's Brief 
constitutes the only evidence from which the jury could find the 
Defendant to be the same person identified in the certified driving 
record, Officer Meacham clearly identified the Defendant as the 
person he saw driving on the date in question. (Tr.-8, pp. 50-57). 
The Officer had personally obtained the certified copy of the 
Defendant's driving record, Exhibit "1". The Defendant offered no 
evidence in rebuttal to the certified driving record, either to 
claim that he was not the same person, or that he had not received 
notice of the suspension. Finally, the identical name and date of 
birth appear on both the Information and on Exhibit "1", and the. 
jury had access to both records to determine the Defendant's 
identity. (R., pp. 76-84, 186). 
Utah Code Ann. §41-2-122 provides that notice given by mail is 
complete upon the expiration of four (4) days after the deposit of 
the notice in the mail, addressed to the address shown by the 
records of the Driver's License Division. There being no evidence 
to the contrary in the record, Defendant's argument is without 
merit. 
POINT XII: THE STATUS OF THE OFFICER AS A BAILIFF WAS IRRELEVANT. 
Once again, defense counsel cites no authority whatsoever for 
his claim that the officer should not have both acted as bailiff 
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and testified as a witness at the Motion hearing on April 3, 1992. 
Moreover, defense counsel expressly waived any objection thereto. 
(Tr.-3, pp. 3-4). The Defendant was not incarcerated, so there was 
no issue with courtroom security. A different bailiff was provided 
at the trial. In short, there was no possible prejudice which 
could have resulted to the Defendant. Defendant's claim is without 
merit. 
POINT XIII: DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO CHANGING THE DATE ON THE 
INFORMATION WAS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, clearly provides 
that an information may be amended at any time before verdict, so 
long as the substantial rights of the Defendant are not prejudiced. 
Defendant made no request for a bill of particulars or other 
inquiry regarding this incident. Therefore, he cannot now claim 
prejudice from evidence which established the date of the offense. 
State v Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 
1044 (1988). 
This issue was given a full and fair hearing at the time of 
the hearing on April 3, 1992. The trial court correctly granted 
the motion to amend, and this Court should affirm that ruling. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
submits that the Defendant has neither marshaled sufficient 
evidence nor demonstrated sufficient error which would warrant a 
reversal of any of the rulings of the trial court, or an 
overturning of the jury verdict of guilty and the judgment of 
conviction entered in this case. On the contrary, there is 
substantial, competent, and unrebutted evidence to support every 
element of the charge in this case. Therefore, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court sustain the jury verdict and 
affirm the judgment and rulings of the trial court in all respects. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1992. 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of August, 1992, I 
delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Ted 
S. Perry, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant, at 29 West 100 
North, Logan, Utah 84321. 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF 
LTAH Hl'LEh Or CRIMINAL rROCEDrRF Rule 6 
magistrate having jurisdiction to investigate 
charge and determine if there was probable 
cause to believe that offense had been commit-
ted and that defendant was guiltv thereof 
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71* P.2d 196 
(1937). 
Prosecution by complaint. 
Filing of complaint in district court by dis-
trict attorney charging defendant with injur-
ing cow by altering and defacing brand was 
improper, as statute provided that all criminal 
matters in district court could only be prose-
cuted by information or indictment. State v. 
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941). 
Prosecution by information. 
—Constitutionality. 
Prosecution by information for noncapital 
felony, committed after statehood, was not in 
violation of federal Constitution. Maxwell v. 
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597 
(1900). 
—Presentment and filing. 
Once the information is authorized by the 
prosecuting attorney, its presentment and fil-
ing are not acts which the prosecuting attorney 
must personally perform. State ex rel. Cannon 
v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
—Procedure. 
The steps required to properly initiate prose-
cution of a felony by information are: (1) 
screening of the case by the prosecutor; (2) au-
thorization of the prosecution, evidenced by the 
signature of the prosecutor affixed to the infor-
mation; (3) presentment of the information to a 
magistr.'.e, (4) subscribing and swearing to the 
information bv the complaining witness, and 
(5) filing of the information with the magis-
trate or clerk of the court. State ex rel Cannon 
v. Leary, 646 P 2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
—Signature. 
Deputy district attorney being authorized by 
law to subscribe and file information, his sign-
ing as district attorney, while constituting an 
irregularity, did not invalidate information. 
State v. Merntt. 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 
(1926). 
Although prosecutor's authorization and sig-
nature affixed on the reverse side of an infor-
mation violated Rule 10(d), U.R.C.P., requiring 
limiting impressions to one side of the paper 
only, such violation did not deprive the trial 
court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Cannon v. 
Leary, 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
Filing of information was held to toll the 
statute of limitations even though prosecuting 
attorney forgot to sign it, since the error did 
not prejudice the defendant, and was one that 
could be corrected. State v. Strand, 674 P.2d 
109 (Utah 1983). 
When jurisdiction of district court at-
taches. 
The accused was brought under the power of 
the district court by the filing of the informa-
tion; the function of the record from the com-
mitting magistrate was to evidence the regu-
larity or irregularity of the proceedings lead-
ing up to attachment of jurisdiction. State v. 
Trujillo, 117 Utah 237, 214 P.2d 626 (1950). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments 
and Informations §§ 2, 4, 25 to 28. 
C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informa-
tions §§ 1, 3, 66. 
A.L.R. — Power of private citizen to insti-
tute criminal proceedings without authoriza-
tion or approval by prosecuting attorney, 66 
A,L.R.3d 732. 
Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's 
discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment 
or by information, 44 A.L.R.4th 401. 
Key Numbers. — Indictment and Informa-
tion «=» 1, 3, 5, 36, 39. 
Rule 6. Warrant of arrest or summons. 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall cause to issue 
either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for the appearance of the ac-
cused. 
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the information, or 
from any affidavit filed with the information, that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has commit-
ted it, the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will appear on a sum-
mons and there is no substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or injury to 
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persons or property, or danger to the community, a summons may issue in lieu 
of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the accused. If the defen-
dant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A warrant of arrest may issue m 
cases where the defendant has failed to appear in response to a summons or 
citation or thereafter when required by the court. When a warrant of arrest is 
issued, the amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate and stated on the 
warrant. 
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The summons may 
be served by a peace officer or any person authorized to serve a summons 
in a civil action. 
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any 
place within the state. 
(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The 
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the 
arrest, but upon request shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon 
as practicable. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at 
the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the offense 
charged and of the fact that the warrant has been issued. The summons 
shall be served as in civil actions, or by mailing it to the defendant's last 
known address. 
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons shall make 
return thereof to the magistrate as soon as practicable. At the request of 
the prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to 
the magistrate for cancellation. 
Cross-References. — Arrest generally, 
§ 77-7-1 et seq. 
Bail, § 77-20-1 et seq. 
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to ap-
pear at arraignment, Rule 10. 
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to ap-
pear for judgment, Rule 22. 
Citation for misdemeanor, §§ 77-7-18 to 
77-7-20. 
Extradition, governor's warrant, § 77-30-7. 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavits. 
Issuance of warrant. 
—Discretion of magistrate. 
Affidavits. 
Affidavits for arrest need not show a prima 
facie case; affidavits need only set forth facts 
tending to establish the commission of the of-
fense and the guilt of the defendant. United 
States v Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P 673 
(1887), appeal dismissed, 145 US. 636y 12 S. 
Ct. 980, 36 L Ed 857 (1892) 
Fees of constable serving warrant or sum-
mons, § 21-3-3.5. 
"Magistrate" defined, § 77-1-3. 
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceed-
ings for issuance of warrant for arrest or for 
issuance of criminal summons, Rule 1101, 
U.R.E. 
Youth Parole Authority, revocation of pa-
role, order to retake violator, § 62A-7-112 
Issuance of warrant. 
—Discretion of magistrate. 
A magistrate is not justified in refusing to 
issue a warrant unless the charge is too indefi-
nitely stated to warrant the belief that an of-
fense has been committed, or that defendant is 
the guilty party. United States v Eldredge, 5 
Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (1887), appeal dismissed, 
145 US 636, 12 S Ct. 980, 36 L Ed 857 
(1892). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Records to be maintained — 
Number of reporters deter-
mined by Judicial Council 
Appointment and terms of circuit 
judges 
78-4-16. Repealed, 
to 78-4-18 Repealed. 
Jury trials — Fees and mileage — 
Jurors and witnesses — Certifi-
cates and costs. 
State responsibility for expenses 
of system — Counties' duties — 
Service of county clerk — Reim-
bursement [Effective until Jan-
uary 1, 1992]. 
Circuit court costs [Effective Jan-
uary 1, 1992]. 
Use of city court facilities — Em-
ployees — Supplies — Equip-
ment [Repealed effective Janu-
ary 1, 1992]. 
Allocation of fines, fees, court 
Section 
cost**, and foifeitures imposed 
[Effective until January 1 
19921 
Allocation of fines, fees, costs and 
forfeitures imposed [Effective 
January 1, 1992]. 
78-4-23. Remission of monies collected [Ef-
fective January 1, 1992]. 
78-4-24. Fees for filing and other services 
or actions [Effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1992]. 
Fees for filing and other services 
or actions [Effective January 1, 
1992]. 
78-4-25. Repealed. 
78-4-26. Governing bodies may provide 
support functions through other 
offices like provided for district 
courts [Repealed effective Janu-
ary 1, 1992]. 
78-4-29 to 78-4-32. Repealed. 
78-4-3. Definitions [Repealed effective January 1, 1992]. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Primary circuit court location" means a city or cities in each cir-
cuit where the circuit judge or judges maintain regular court hours in a 
permanent court facility from which secondary locations in the circuit are 
served under this act. The city may or may not be a county seat, and there 
may be more than one primary location in a circuit. 
(2) "Secondary circuit court location" means those county seats where 
services are provided by the county, pursuant to contract with the admin-
istrative office of the courts. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-3, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 28. 
Repealed effective January 1, 1992. — 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals § 78-4-3, as 
last amended by L. 1988, ch. 248, § 28, relat-
ing to circuit courts definitions, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1992. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, rewrote Subsec-
tion (2) following "county" which had read 
"seat cities or other municipalities m the cir-
cuit served by the circuit judge or judges from 
the primary circuit location or locations"; de-
leted former Subsections (3) to (7) which had 
contained definitions of "Clerk of the circuit 
court," "Circuit court clerk's office," "Record on 
appeal," "Transcribed record on appeal," and 
"Substitute judge"; and made minor stylistic 
changes in Subsection (1). 
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this 
act," in the preliminary language and in Sub-
section (1), means Laws 1977, Chapter 77, 
which enacted various sections throughout Ti-
tles 10, 11, 17, 20, 21, 31 (now repealed), 39, 
49, 51, 53 (now repealed), 76, and 78. See the 
Tables of Session Laws in the Parallel Tables 
volume. 
78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent [Effec-
tive until January 1, 1992]. 
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors and 
infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and may impose 
the punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of the circuit 
court has the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including the 
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conducting of proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of per-
sons charged with criminal offenses. 
(b) When a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under 
Section 77-3-1 or an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate 
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be commenced or the arrested 
person may be taken before any circuit court judge in the county or the 
justice court judge in the county in whose precinct the offense occurred, 
unless both are unavailable; then before any justice court judge having 
jurisdiction. 
(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41 except offenses 
charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the munici-
pal justice court or the county justice court where the offense occurred if 
those justice courts exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses. 
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising 
under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving persons 
18 years of age or older, but if a county justice court exists in the county, 
jurisdiction is concurrent. 
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases aris-
ing under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involv-
ing persons 18 years of age and older in those municipalities in which a 
municipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created. 
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with county justice 
courts over violations of municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years 
of age and older with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving 
in municipalities within a county precinct in which a municipal justice 
court does not exist. 
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice 
courts over violations of state statutes in municipalities where a munici-
pal justice court exists. 
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed by 
persons older than 16 and younger than 18 years of age except those offenses 
exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection (l)(c), Subsection 
78-3a-16(l)(a), and Section 78-5-105. The circuit court shall notify the juvenile 
court of a conviction of any person younger than 18 years of age of an offense 
under Section 78-3a-39.5. 
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and 
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for 
suspension under Section 41-2-128. 
(6) Circuit court judges may transfer cases within the court's jurisdiction 
under Subsection (4) to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings ac-
cording to rules of the Judicial Council. 
Circuit court jurisdiction — Jurisdiction in 
circuit court when no justice court — Jurisdic-
tion retained until effective date [Effective Janu-
ary 1, 1992]. 
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class A misdemeanors. Circuit courts 
have jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors classified by Article 5, Chapter 6, 
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Title 41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, ordinances that 
comply with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors 
classified by any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over 
all related misdemeanors arising out of a single criminal episode. When a 
justice court is given jurisdiction of a criminal matter and there is no justice 
court with territorial jurisdiction, the circuit court shall have jurisdiction. The 
circuit court shall retain jurisdiction over cases properly filed in the circuit 
court prior to January 1, 1992. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction as 
provided in Section 10-3-923. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 29; 1989, 
ch. 150, § 5; 1989, ch. 157, § 9; 1989, ch. 188, 
§ 8; 1990, ch. 55, § 2; 1991, ch. 268, § 30. 
Amended effective January 1, 1992. — 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 30 amends this section 
effective January 1,1992. See amendment note 
below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided Subsec-
tion (1) into subsections; substituted "Section 
77-3-1" and "Section 77-7-18" for "Section 
77-57-2" and "Section 77-13-17," respectively, 
in the first sentence of Subsection (l)(b); and 
made minor stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 150, effective 
April 24, 1989, rewrote Subsection (4) which 
read "The circuit court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the juvenile court over all traffic of-
fenses committed by persons younger than 18 
years of age"; added Subsection (5); and made a 
minor stylistic change in Subsection (2). 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 157, effective 
July 1,1989, designated the former second sen-
tence of Subsection (l)(b) as Subsection (l)(c); 
substituted justice court judge" for "justice of 
the peace" in two places in present Subsection 
(l)(b); substituted "municipal justice court or 
the county justice court" for "court of the mu-
nicipal justice of the peace of the precinct of the 
county justice of the peace" in Subsection (l)(c); 
substituted "a county justice court" for "the of-
fice of precinct justice of the peace" in Subsec-
tion (2); designated former Subsection (3) as 
present Subsection (3)(a); added Subsections 
(3)(b) and (3)(c); and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 188, effective 
July 1,1989, designated the former second sen-
tence of Subsection (1Kb) as (l)(c); added the 
second sentence of Subsection (4); and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, rewrote the first sentence in Subsection 
(4), which read "The circuit court has jurisdic-
tion over all traffic offenses committed by per-
sons younger than 18 years of age, except those 
offenses exclusive to the juvenile court under 
Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a)," and added Subsec-
tion (6). 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, deleted the (l)(a) designation, rewrote 
the first sentence, which read "Circuit courts 
have jurisdiction over all classes of misde-
meanors and infractions involving persons 18 
years of age and older and may impose the 
punishments prescribed for these offenses," de-
leted the former second sentence, which read 
"The judge of the circuit court has the author-
ity and jurisdiction of a magistrate including 
the conducting of proceedings for the prelimi-
nary examination to determine probable cause, 
commitment prior to trial, or the release on 
bail of persons charged with criminal offenses," 
added the remaining language, and deleted 
former Subsections (l)(b), (l)(c), and (2) 
through (6). 
78-4-6. Municipal department of circuit court — Report to 
court administrator [Repealed effective January 
1, 1992]. 
(1) (a) The governing body of any municipality may by ordinance establish 
a municipal department of the circuit court. A circuit court in this capac-
ity is the "municipal department of the (naming the circuit) circuit court 
for (naming the municipality), Utah." 
(b) A circuit court established under Subsection (l)(a), for which fund-
ing is not available at time of establishment, may not be implemented 
until funding is provided for the court. 
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Subsection (1) when a person fails or refuses to surrender any of those docu-
ments to the division upon demand. 
(3) The division shall assess against a person making an application re-
ferred to in Subsection 41-2-112(14), in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(14), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to , over the costs required 
to serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection (2). 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-23.5, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1,1989, inserted "disquali-
1983, ch. 191, § 1; renumbered by L. 1987, fication" in Subsection (l)(a)(i). 
ch. 137, § 34; 1988, ch. 98, § 1; 1989, ch. 209, The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
§ 19; 1990, ch. 30, § 7. 1990, substituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- "41-2-112(6)" in two places in Subsection (3). 
41-2-136, Operating vehicle prohibited while license de-
nied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Pen-
alties. 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which his license 
was issued and who operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of this 
state while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be 
punished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation 
specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a vehicle while his license is 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with the require-
ments of Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(v) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a 
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one 
or more of the sections or ordinances under this subsection; 
(vi) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under 
Subsection 41-2-127(2); or 
(vii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial 
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, can-
celed, or revoked under Subsection 41-2-715(1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based upon his operating a vehicle while his license is 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licensure for violations 
corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a). 
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at least the maximum 
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 29; C. 1943, ch. 252, § 7; 1990, ch. 30, § 8; 1991, ch. 241, 
57-4-32; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 8; 1983, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 80, § 3. 
§ 27; C. 1953, 41-2-28; renumbered by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
1987, ch. 137, § 36; 1989, ch. 209, § 20; 1989, ment by ch. 252, effective April 24, 1989, in-
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serted "denied" m two places in Subsection (1) The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
and substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in 1991, substituted "class C" for "class B" in Sub-
Subsection (3)(a)(vi). sections (2) and (3)(b) and substituted "class B" 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective for "class A" in Subsection (3)(a). 
July 1, 1989, inserted "disqualified" twice in The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
Subsection (1) and once m Subsection (3)(a),
 1 9 9 2 ) substituted "or under the laws of the 
a n £ m a d ^ stylistic changes.
 s t a t e i n w h l c h h l s h c e n s e w a s l s s u e d a n d w h o 
, J n 6 1 9 9 ? ^ e n ^ e n t \ e ^ V e « p n l « 2 ? ' operates" for "and operates" in Subsection (1), 
1990, inserted violation of a before loca in
 s u b s t l t u t e d « t h a t„ for « w m c h „ m Subsection 
Subsection (3)(a)(m); substituted action for , „ V o V i , , , , ^nonn4r o„u e o , .^„ /QVM ^ 
"prohibition" and inserted "to" after "guilty" in f W ( m ) , added present Subsect on (3)(b), re-
Subsection (3)(a)(v); substituted "a revocation designated former Subsection (3)(b) as present 
or suspension which" for "whose revocation or Subsection (3)(c), and substituted at least for 
suspension" at the beginning of Subsection m a n amount not less than m Subsection 
(3)(a)(vi); and added Subsection (3)(a)(vu). <3)(c). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in United States v. Peck, 762 F. Supp. 
315 (D Utah 1991). 
41-2-137. Violation of chapter — Misdemeanor. 
A violation of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise speci-
fied. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 30; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
57-4-33; L. 1967, ch. 83, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 9; ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
1986, ch. 178, § 25; C. 1953, 41-2-29; renum- "class C" for "class B." 
bered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 37; 1991, ch. 241, 
§ 61. 
PART 2 
LICENSES — IMPAIRED PERSONS 
41-2-202. Driver License Medical Advisory Board — Mem-
bership — Guidelines for licensing impaired per-
sons — Recommendations to division. 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-241 provides 
that the Driver License Medical Advisory 
Board is repealed July 1, 1997. 
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History: C. 1953, 41-2-103, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 137, § 3; 1989, ch. 209, § 2; 1989, 
ch. 252, § 2; 1990, ch. 30, § 2; 1991, ch. 190, 
§ 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment by ch. 252, effective April 24, 1989, in-
serted "or if denied under Section 41-2-114" in 
Subsection (4)(a) and added "and" at the end of 
Subsection (13). 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective 
July 1, 1989, so rewrote the section as to make 
a detailed analysis impracticable. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, rewrote the section to such an extent 
that a detailed analysis is impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment, effective October 1, 
1991, substituted "Section 41-2-112 is $15" for 
"Subsection 41-2-112(1) is $10"in Subsections 
(1) and (2); substituted "Section 41-2-112 is 
$20" for "Subsection 41-2-112(1) is $15" in Sub-
sections (3) and (4); substituted "Section 
41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2-112(1)" in Sub-
section (5); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is 
$15" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $10" in Sub-
41-2-104. Operators must be 
ment. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 2; C. 1943, 
57-4-4; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 5; 
1985, ch. 21, § 18; 1987, ch. 162, § 24; C. 
1953, § 41-2-2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 
137, § 4; 1987, ch. 162, § 24; 1989, ch. 209, 
§ 3. 
Cited in Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1988). 
sections (6) to (9); substituted "Section 
41-2-125" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5)" in Sub-
section (10); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is 
$5" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $3" in Sub-
section (11); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is 
$12" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $10" in Sub-
sections (12) and (13); substituted "Section 
41-2-125 is $12" for "Subsection 41-2-125(3)(a) 
is $10" in Subsections (14) and (15); substi-
tuted "Section 41-2-125" for "Section 41-2-
125(5)" in Subsections (16) and (17); substi-
tuted "Section 41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2-
112(7)" in Subsections (22) and (23); substi-
tuted "$10" for "$5" in Subsection (24); substi-
tuted "Section 41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2-
112(14)" in Subsections (25)(a) and (25)(b); sub-
stituted "Section 41-2-130" for "Subsection 41-
2-130(8)(a)" and "Section 41-6-44.10" for "Sub-
section 41-6-44.10(2)(e)" in Subsection (26); 
substituted "Section 41-2-134" for "Subsection 
41-2-134(3)" in Subsection (28); added present 
Subsection (29) and (30); redesignated former 
Subsection (29) as present Subsection (31); and 
made a stylistic change. 
licensed — Taxicab endorse-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1989, added Subsection 
(3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under Section 41-2-107, 
41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2-121(4), or Title 41, Chapter 22, may 
operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is li-
censed as an operator by the division under this chapter. 
(2) No person, except those exempted under Section 41-2-107, may operate 
or, while within the passenger compartment of a vehicle, exercise any degree 
or form of physical control of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle upon a 
highway unless the person holds a valid license issued under this chapter for 
the type or class of vehicle being towed. 
(3) (a) A person may not operate a motor vehicle as a taxicab on a highway 
of this state unless the person has a taxicab endorsement issued by the 
division on his driver license. 
(b) This subsection applies to all Utah licenses originally issued, re-
newed, or extended on or after July 1, 1989. 
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41-2-137 MOTOR VEHICLES 
serted "denied" m two places in Subsection (1) The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
and substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in 1991, substituted "class C" for "class B" in Sub-
Subsection (3)(a)(vi). sections (2) and (3)(b) and substituted "class B" 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective for "class A" in Subsection (3)(a). 
July 1, 1989, inserted "disqualified" twice in
 T h e 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
Subsection (1) and once in Subsection (3)(a),
 1 9 9 2 ) substituted "or under the laws of the 
a n £ m a ^ stylistic changes.
 s t a t e i n w h i c h h i s l i c e n s e w a s i s s u e d a n d w h o 
1 J n 6 1 9 9 ? ™ e n * * e n t ' f^*ive ^ P " * 2 ? ' operates" for "and operates" in Subsection (1), 
1990, inserted violation of a before loca in
 s u b s t i t u t e d « t h a t» f o r «which» i n S u b seC t lon 
Subsection (3)(aXm); substituted action for ,o w V...N , , , . 0 , , , o y , , 
"prohibition" and inserted "to" after "guilty" in (3)(a)(m) added present Subsection (3)(b), re-
Subsection (3)(a)(v); substituted "a revocation designated former Subsection (3)(b) as present 
or suspension which" for "whose revocation or Subsection (3)(c), and substituted at least for 
suspension" at the beginning of Subsection i n a n amount not less than in Subsection 
(3)(a)(vi); and added Subsection (3)(a)(vii). W^-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in United States v. Peck, 762 F. Supp. 
315 (D. Utah 1991). 
41-2-137. Violation of chapter — Misdemeanor. 
A violation of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise speci-
fied. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 30; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
57-4-33; L. 1967, ch. 83, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 9; ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
1986, ch. 178, § 25; C. 1953, 41-2-29; renum- "class C" for "class B." 
bered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 37; 1991, ch. 241, 
§ 61. 
PART 2 
LICENSES — IMPAIRED PERSONS 
41-2-202. Driver License Medical Advisory Board — Mem-
bership — Guidelines for licensing impaired per-
sons — Recommendations to division. 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-241 provides 
that the Driver License Medical Advisory 
Board is repealed July 1, 1997. 
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76-1-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Conduct constituting separate crimes. 
—Property pawned separately. 
Traffic offenses. 
Cited. 
Conduct constituting single crime. 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
viduals is a single act and a single offense if 
evidence shows that the items were retained 
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items 
were the subject of a previous prosecution for 
related offenses, a second prosecution was pre-
cluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 
1983). 
Conduct constituting separate crimes. 
Where defendant committed a robbery in one 
county, and later, in another county some 65 
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and de-
cided to kidnap them as hostages, the differ-
ence in time, location, and the criminal objec-
tives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the 
conduct separate crimes rather than one single 
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 
1206 (Utah 1977). 
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the 
failure to stop at the command of a police offi-
cer were two separate offenses, and not a single 
episode, because the two offenses occurred a 
day apart and the criminal objective in the un-
lawful taking was to obtain possession while 
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was 
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v. 
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "sin-
gle criminal episode" since he committed two 
separate burglaries by breaking into two sepa-
rate buildings within an apartment complex, 
even though the burglaries were only 20 
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1985). 
—Property pawned separately. 
Where property was stolen and defendant re-
ceived and pawned it on three separate days 
spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did 
not arise out of a single cnminal episode. State 
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 'Utah 1986). 
Traffic offenses. 
This section does not prevent the prosecution 
of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 af-
ter the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving 
without a license, without a registration certif-
icate and without a safety sticker, since the 
citations charge separate offenses entirely un-
related to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 
P.2d 253 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 
P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Fletcher, 751 
P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 
751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989), 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
Law § 20. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 29. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all sepa-
rate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-402 
<3) A defendant may he convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, § 2. Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const., 
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act Amend. V; § 77-1-6. 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violat-
ing another statute, § 76-6-704. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Act." 
Judgment entered for included offense after re-
versal of conviction. 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 










Misdemeanor and felony charges. 
Separate offenses. 
—Automobile violations. 
—Burglary and larceny. 




"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not 
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the 
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a 
defendant. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Judgment entered for included offense af-
ter reversal of conviction. 
Where there was insufficient evidence to 
support defendant's conviction for second de-
gree murder, but there was sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the included offense 
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to 
this section, vacated and set aside the convic-
tion of second degree murder on appeal and 
entered a judgment of conviction for the in-
cluded offense of manslaughter. State v. 
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk 
of death was insufficient to support defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder, but there 
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to sup-
port a conviction of the included offense of 
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial 
and to enter a judgment of conviction for man-
slaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1985). 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the 
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41-2-122 MOTOR VEHICLES 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur 2d Automo- C.J.S. — 60 C J.S. Motor Vehicles § 146. 
biles and Highway Traffic § 96 et seq. Key Numbers. — Automobiles <&=> 136. 
41-2-122. Change of address — Duty of licensee to notify 
division within ten days — Method of giving no-
tice by division. 
(1) When a person, after applying for or receiving a license, moves from the 
address named in the application or in the license certificate issued to him, 
the person shall within ten days notify the division in writing of his new 
address and of the number of any license held by him. 
(2) (a) When the division is authorized or required to give any notice under 
this chapter or other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a 
different method of giving notice is otherwise prescribed, the notice shall 
be given either by personal delivery to the person to be notified or by 
deposit in the United States mail of the notice in an envelope with post-
age prepaid, addressed to the person at his address as shown by the 
records of the division. The giving of notice by mail is complete upon the 
expiration of four days after the deposit of the notice. 
(b) Proof of the giving of notice in either manner may be made by the 
certificate of any officer or employee of the division or affidavit of any 
person older than 18 years of age, naming the person to whom the notice 
was given and specifying the time, place, and manner of the giving of it. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-13.1, enacted by L. appeared as § 41-2-13.1, designated the former 
1967, ch. 82, § 10; 1983, ch. 183, § 17; re- section as Subsection (1), substituted "division" 
numbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 22. for "department" and made changes m phrase-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- ology in Subsection (1), and added Subsection 
ment renumbered this section which formerly (2). 
41-2-123. Duplicate license certificate — Fee. 
(1) If a license certificate issued under the provisions of this chapter is lost, 
stolen, or destroyed, the person to whom it was issued may obtain a duplicate 
upon furnishing proof satisfactory to the division that the license certificate 
has been lost, stolen, or destroyed and upon payment of a fee under Section 
41-2-103. 
(2) When the division is advised that a license certificate has been lost, 
stolen, or destroyed, it is then void. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 14; 1935, ch. 47, 
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 54-7-17; L. 
1951, ch. 64, § 1; 1967, ch. 82, § 8; 1982, ch. 
44, § 6; 1983, ch. 183, § 18; C. 1953, 41-2-14; 
renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment renumbered this section which formerly 
appeared as § 41-2-14, designated the first 
sentence as Subsection (1) and the second sen-
tence as Subsection (2), substituted "division" 
for "department" throughout the section, and 
made minor changes in phraseology and style 
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MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 41-12a-412 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-407, enacted by ments in an amount equal to twice the single 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 4. limit amount under Subsection 31 A-22-304(2)M 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- following "has" in Subsection (1); substituted 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Sub- "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2); 
section (2) designation; redesignated former and substituted "In accordance with Chapter 
Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3), added 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act" 
Subsections (l)ia), (1Mb), and 14); deleted "and for "l3pon not less than five days' notice and a 
will continue to have the ability to pay judg- hearing pursuant to notice" in Subsection (3). 
41-12a-412. Proof of owner's or operator's security re-
quired to preserve registration. 
(1) A motor vehicle may not be registered in the name of any person re-
quired to file proof of owner's security unless proof of that security is fur-
nished for the motor vehicle. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (b), if the department lawfully suspends or 
revokes the driver's license of any person upon receiving record of a con-
viction or a forfeiture of bail from a court of record, the department shall 
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered in the name 
of the person. 
(b) Unless otherwise required by law, the department may not suspend 
the person's motor vehicle registration under Subsection (a), if the person 
has given or immediately gives and then maintains proof of owner's secu-
rity for all motor vehicles registered by the person. 
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under this section may 
not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued, nor may 
any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in the name of the person until he 
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment is convicted of 
or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for 
any offense requiring the suspension or revocation of license, or for operating 
an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, a license may not thereaf-
ter be issued to the person and a motor vehicle may not continue or be regis-
tered in his name until he gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's 
security. 
(5) If the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's operating privi-
lege because of a conviction or forfeiture of bail, the privilege remains sus-
pended or revoked unless the person has given or immediately gives and 
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-412, enacted by record" near the middle of that subsection, sub-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1992, ch. 80, § 4. stituted all of the present language of Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- tion (2)(b) before "if the person" for "The de-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added the sub- partment may not suspend the person's motor 
section designations (2)(a) and (2Kb), added vehicle registration unless otherwise required 
"Subject to Subsection (b)" at the beginning of by law," and made stylistic changes through-
Subsection (2)(a) and inserted "from a court of out the section. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 4 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Service on attorney. record is sufficient. State v WagstafT, 772 P.2d 
Notice served upon a party's attorney of 987 (Utah Ct. App 1989). 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indict-
ment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense 
has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information 
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things 
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be al-
leged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they 
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning 
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presump-
tions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indict-
ment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indict-
ment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for 
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall 
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essen-
tial elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any 
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate 
the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information 
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall 
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Rule 4 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on appli-
cation of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except 
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he pro-
poses to call whose names are not so endorsed 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural 
person 
Cross-References. — Accused entitled to 
copy of accusation, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 12 
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction, 
§ 78-4-5 
Jurisdiction of military court, § 39-6-16 
Criminal Code definition of "corporation," 
§ 76-2-201 
Criminal Code not strictly construed, 
§ 76-1 106 
Criminal responsibility of corporation, 
§ 76-2-204 
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct 
in name of corporation, § 76-2-205 
Double jeopardy, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 12, 
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77-1-6 
General definitions for Criminal Code, 
§ 76-1-601 
"Indictment" defined, § 77-1-3 
"Information" defined, § 77-1-3 
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 
Justice courts, criminal jurisdiction 
§ 78-5-104 et seq 
Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer, §§ 78 3a-16 
to 78-3a-19 
Nonmatenal errors and mistakes, Rule 30 
Preliminary examination, Rule 7 
Proof of corporate existence, § 77-17-5 
Prosecution by indictment or information af 
ter examination and commitment or waiver 
thereof, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 13 
Removal of officers, Utah Const, Art VI, 
Sec 21, § 77-6-1 et seq 
Statutory construction and definitions m 
general, §§ 68-3-11, 68-3-12 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Bills of particulars 
—In general 
—Contents 
—Discretion of court 
—Effect on evidence at trial 
—Failure to provide 
—Failure to request 










Time and place of offense 
Victim 





—Procedure upon information 
—Sufficiency 
—Use of disjunctive 
Cited 
Bills of particulars. 
—In general. 
If an accused is in doubt as to the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, the al 
leged fact or facts the state proposes to prove 
might be secured by demanding a bill of partic-
ulars State v Robbms, 102 Utah 119,127 P 2d 
1042 (1942) 
Where defendant in manslaughter prosecu 
tion was charged with only one unlawful act, a 
battery, allegation in bill of particulars that 
battery occurred when defendant engaged in 
mutual combat with deceased was mere sur 
plusage and did not state separate unlawful 
act State v Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P2d 
738 (1947) 
—Contents. 
There is no requirement that defendant be 
told in a bill of particulars what evidence will 
be presented to prove the charge against him 
State v Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P 2d 831 
(1970) 
A bill of particulars need not plead matters 
of evidence that the prosecution plans to use at 
trial State v Mitchell, 571 P 2d 1351 (Utah 
1977) 
—Discretion of court. 
Granting of bill of particulars was not discre 
tionary with court, but under statute was a 
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SEP 2 1992 
Qary O. McKean 110 north 100 West James C. Jenkins 
County Attorney Logan, Utah 84321 Deputy 
(801) 752-8920 Jeffrey "R" Burbank 
Deputy 
Patrick B. riolan 
Deputy 
September 01, 1992 
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: State v. Dunbar 
Case No. 920341-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
We just realized that, in our Brief of Appellee in the above-
entitled case, which we mailed to you on Friday, August 28, 1992, 
we inadvertently left out copies of the Criminal Summons and 
Information (pp. 184-186 of the Record) from the Addendum to the 
Brief. 
Enclosed are eight (8) copies each of the Criminal Summons and 
Information. Please add them to the documents already included in 
the Addendum to the Brief. 
We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this oversight, 
and thank you for your assistance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
Enclosures 
cc: Ted Perry (w/enclosures) 
PBN:cat 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OfTUTAH ~" ' V j £ D 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
. i-^L.. , 1 I H *»' 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




No.^ (| ^  COL/S /J— 
The undersigned Jim Mecham, under oath states on information and 
belief that the above named defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
CRIME: Driving During Suspension 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-2-136 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
CLASSIFICATION: Class C Misdemeanor 
AT: Cache County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: May 17, 1991 
The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did 
wilfully and unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon the 
highways of this State after his Driver's License had been 
suspended. 
The information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Jim Mecham 
Authorized for presentment 
and filing by the Cache 
County Attorney: 
Subscribed a/hd sworn to before 
me this 3> \ _ day of 
BY ^ • K _ 
05-31-91 Summons Issued. 
en 




IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAHJ ° "I ' ' 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT ^y 
^ - i * I I n . 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON W. DUNBAR, 
Defendant. 
S U M M O N S 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT(S) : 
Complaint under oath by Jim Mecham has been made that you 
committed the crime of: 
CRIME: 
IN VIOLATION OF; 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Driving During Suspension 
Section 41-2-136 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
Class C Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
May 17, 1991 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appear before a judge of the 
Circuit Court at 140 North 1st West, Logan, Utah 9:00 a.m. on the 
first Tuesday following the service of this summons upon you to 
answer the charge made against you. If you fail to obey this 
summons, the court may issue a warrant for your Arrest. 
Dated x^hlc * 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
J 11 i j
 ( 
County of Cache ) 
I hereby make return of service, and certify: 
1. 
3. 
I am a duly qualified and acting peace oc;:cei; ;:r am ^ 
person over the age of 21 years, and am :* ~.~ a party to 
this action. 
I received this Summons on the date of , 
and served it upon the defendant(s) listed below by 
leaving, at the address(es) and on the date(s) shown 
below, a copy with the defendant or with a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the usual place of abode 
of the defendant, to whom T ,?I<*O showed the original. 
Upon service the same, I endorsed the date and place of 
service and my name on the copy served. 
Defendant's name and address 
Don W. Dunbar 
DOB. i 12-18-53 
(State whether defendant was served 
personally; if not, include name of 




 t %s<& l S^\ ' / , 
DATED: 
p—^^t*?' 
{Official Tltfle) 
tP 
^ V; 
% 
